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CRIMES AND OFFENSES 
Homicide: Amend Article 1 of Chapter 5 of Title 16 of the Official 
Code of Georgia Annotated, Relating to Homicide, so as to Repeal 
Certain Provisions Regarding Offering to Assist in the Commission 
of a Suicide; Prohibit Assisted Suicide; Provide for Definitions; 
Provide for Criminal Penalties; Provide for Certain Exceptions; 
Provide for Certain Reporting Requirements with Respect to Being 
Convicted of Assisting in a Suicide; Amend Section 3 of Chapter 14 
of Title 16 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Relating to 
Definitions for the “Georgia RICO (Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations) Act,” so as to Provide for Assisted Suicide 
as Racketeering Activity; Amend Section 6 of Chapter 4 of Title 51 
of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Relating to Torts, so as 
to Provide for Reporting Requirements with Respect to a Civil 
Judgment Against a Health Care Provider; Provide for 
Applicability; Provide an Effective Date; Repeal Conflicting Laws; 
and for Other Purposes 
CODE SECTIONS:  O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-5 (amended); 
16-14-3 (amended); 51-4-6 (new) 
BILL NUMBER:  HB 1114 
ACT NUMBER:  639 
GEORGIA LAWS:  2012 Ga. Laws 637 
SUMMARY: The Act prohibits assisted suicide and 
provides for certain criminal penalties, 
reporting requirements by healthcare 
providers, and exceptions. 
Furthermore, it adds assisted suicide to 
the list of predicate RICO offenses. 
Finally, it mandates reporting 
requirements with respect to a civil 
judgment against a health care 
provider. 
EFFECTIVE DATE: May 1, 2012 
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History  
On February 6, 2012, the Georgia Supreme Court struck down 
Code section 16-5-5(b) banning the public advertising of assisted 
suicide1 in Final Exit Network, Inc. v. State.2 In that case, a Forsyth 
County grand jury indicted defendants Final Exit Network, Inc., 
Thomas Goodwin, Lawrence Egbert, Nicholas Sheridan, and Claire 
Blehr in March 2010 “on charges of, inter alia, offering to assist and 
assisting in the commission of suicide in violation of O.C.G.A. 
section 16-5-5(b).”3 The defendants challenged the statute as 
“unconstitutional on its face.”4 They contended that the statute 
violated “several constitutional provisions” of the United States and 
Georgia Constitutions, including their right to free speech.5 The 
Georgia Supreme Court granted the “application for interlocutory 
appeal to consider [the] constitutional challenges.”6  
The court agreed that the law was constitutionally deficient 
because it impinged on the First Amendment freedom of speech right 
when it banned only public advertising of offers to assist in suicide.7 
The court highlighted the statute’s failure to criminalize all assisted 
suicide.8 The statute banned only assisted suicide that includes “a 
public advertisement or offer to assist” in the commission of suicide.9 
This narrow focus took it “out of the realm of content neutral 
regulations and render[ed] it a selective restraint on speech with a 
particular content,” subject to strict scrutiny.10 
Under strict scrutiny, the statute must be justified by a compelling 
state interest and must be narrowly tailored to the state purpose.11 
While the court recognized the “[s]tate’s interest in preserving human 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Pursuant to former Code section § 16-5-5(b), “[a]ny person who publicly advertises, offers, or 
holds himself or herself out as offering that he or she will intentionally and actively assist another 
person in the commission of suicide and commits any overt act to further that purpose is guilty of a 
felony . . . .” 1994 Ga. Laws 1371. 
 2. Final Exit Network, Inc. v. State, 290 Ga. 508, 511, 722 S.E.2d 722, 725 (2012). 
 3. Id. at 508, 722 S.E.2d at 723. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 509, 511, 722 S.E.2d at 723, 725. 
 8. Final Exit Network, 290 Ga. at 509, 722 S.E.2d at 723. 
 9. Id. at 509–10, 722 S.E.2d at 723–25. 
 10. Id. at 509, 722 S.E.2d at 723. 
 11. Id. at 509, 722 S.E.2d at 724. 
2
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 14
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol29/iss1/14
280 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1 
life” as compelling, it found that the act was not narrowly drawn to 
fit the “asserted interest” of suicide prevention because it was 
extremely underinclusive.12 In addition, the court found no sufficient 
justification for the “intrusion on protected speech rights” triggered 
by the criminalization of a public advertisement or offer to assist in 
an otherwise legal activity.13 
House Bill (HB) 1114 banning assisted suicide was presented to 
the House just sixteen days after the court handed down its 
unanimous decision on the case.14 This prompt response to the 
court’s decision was not coincidental. The impetus for the bill stemed 
from the deficiencies of the invalidated Georgia statute itself—
including its ban of the public advertising of assisted suicide but not 
of all assisted suicide—and not even of all advertising of assisted 
suicide.15 
Bill Tracking of HB 1114 
Consideration and Passage by the House 
Representatives Ed Setzler (R-35th), Rich Golick (R-34th), Matt 
Ramsey (R-72nd), B.J. Pak, (R-102nd), Edward Lindsey (R-54th), 
and Tom Rice (R-51st) sponsored HB 1114 in the House.16 The bill 
was first read on February 22, 2012.17 The bill was read for the 
second time on February 23, 2012.18 Speaker of the House David 
Ralston (R-7th) assigned the bill to the Judicial Non-Civil 
Committee, which favorably reported a House Committee substitute 
on February 28, 2012.19 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Id. at 509–10, 722 S.E.2d at 724. For instance, the statute did not “ban assistance in all suicides,” 
“[n]or [did] § 16-5-5(b) render illegal all advertisements or offers to assist in a suicide.” Id. 
 13. Id. at 510, 722 S.E.2d at 724. 
 14. HB 1114, as introduced, 2012 Ga. Gen. Assem.; see Final Exit Network, 290 Ga. at 511, 722 
S.E.2d at 725. 
 15. See Telephone Interview with Rep. Ed Setzler (R-35th) (May 2, 2012) [hereinafter Setzler 
Interview]; see also Jamie Reese, Georgia High Court Overturns Assisted Suicide Law, JURIST (Feb. 6, 
2012, 11:38 AM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2012/02/georgia-high-court-overturns-assisted-suicide-
law.php. 
 16. HB 1114, as introduced, 2012 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 17. Id.; State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 1114, May 10, 2012. 
 18. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 1114, May 10, 2012. 
 19. Id. 
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The House Committee substitute contained several substantive 
changes from the bill as introduced. First, it added a “physical” 
component to the definition of “assist[ing].”20 Second, it narrowed 
the “health care provider” definition to exclude “any hospital, nursing 
home, home health agency, institution, or medical facility licensed or 
defined under Chapter 7 of Title 31.”21 Third, it limited liability to 
“any person with actual knowledge that a person intends to commit 
suicide.”22 
Furthermore, the House Committee substitute significantly 
expanded the type of conduct excluded from liability under the 
statutory provisions, particularly as it pertains to representatives of 
the medical profession.23 Specifically, exemptions included conduct 
such as administering medication or medical procedures that may 
have the effect of hastening or increasing the risk of death, 
prescribing, dispensing, or administering medications or medical 
procedures pursuant to a living will, and excluding people advocating 
on behalf of a patient’s wishes that may ultimately lead to or hasten 
that patient’s death.24 The House Committee dedicated a significant 
amount of time to discussing the exemption of “advocacy” on behalf 
of the patient, not only by professional advocates, but also by family 
members who may support the patient’s wishes, even if they go 
against the medical professional’s recommendation.25 The exclusion 
turns on the mens rea of the advocate and does not criminalize 
                                                                                                                 
 20. “‘Assists’ means the act of physically helping or physically providing the means.” HB 1114 
(HCS), § 1(a)(1), p. 1, ln. 18, 2012 Ga. Gen. Assem.; see also Video Recording of House Judiciary Non-
Civil Committee Meeting, Feb. 27, 2012 at 40 min., 37 sec. (remarks by Rep. Ed Setzler (R-35th)), 
http://media.legis.ga.gov/hav/11_12/2012/committees/judiNon/judiNon022712EDITED.wmv 
[hereinafter House Video] (noting the importance of a physical act as a predicate to the offense, as 
opposed to the passive act of publishing a website informing the public at large of the various ways to 
commit suicide). 
 21. Compare HB 1114 (HCS), § 1, p. 1, ln. 19–20, 2012 Ga. Gen. Assem., with HB 1114, as 
introduced, § 1, p. 1–2, ln. 22–27, 2012 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 22. Compare HB 1114 (HCS), § 1, p. 1, ln. 22, 2012 Ga. Gen. Assem., with HB 1114, as introduced, 
§ 1, p. 1–2, ln. 22–27, 2012 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 23. Compare HB 1114 (HCS), § 1, p. 2, ln. 26–47, 2012 Ga. Gen. Assem., with HB 1114, as 
introduced, § 1, p. 2, ln. 29–36, 2012 Ga. Gen. Assem. See also Rep. Butch Parrish, House Approves 
$19.2 Billion State Budget for Fiscal Year 2013, FOREST-BLADE (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.forest-
blade.com/opinion/editorials/article_909326c6-6d49-11e1-8460-0019bb2963f4.html (noting the bill’s 
exclusion of the terms of living wills, “Do Not Resuscitate” orders, “advance directives or similar 
measures intending to limit pain or suffering”). 
 24. House Video, supra note 20, at 48 min., 33 sec. (remarks by Rep. Ed Setzler (R-35th)). 
 25. Id. 
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advocates’ actions that are “intended to relieve or prevent such 
person’s pain or discomfort” and are not intended to cause that 
person’s death.26 
The final change reflected in the House Committee substitute 
almost completely eliminated Chapter 4A in the bill as introduced.27 
The original version of the bill added a new chapter to the wrongful 
death tort entitling the decedent’s survivors to wrongful death 
damages and dealing with disposition of recovery and wrongdoer 
release.28 The House Committee substitute did, however, retain the 
subsection on reasonable attorney’s fees and litigation expenses that 
may be awarded to plaintiffs who prevail in a civil action stemming 
from violations of the assisted suicide provisions of the statute.29 
The House read the House Committee substitute on March 7, 
2012.30 Representative Setzler and Representative Christian Coomer 
(R-14th) offered a Floor Amendment to the House Committee 
substitute—which made a small change in Section 1(c)(4) merely 
streamlining the language in that section—that the House passed 
without objection.31 On the same day, the House passed HB 1114 by 
a vote of 124 to 45 and immediately transmitted the bill to the 
Senate.32 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Id. at 48 min., 33 sec. (remarks by Rep. Ed Setzler (R-35th)); id. at 55 min., 03 sec. (remarks by 
Rep. Ed Setzler (R-35th)); id. at 57 min., 45 sec (remarks by Rep. Ed Setzler (R-35th)). 
 27. Compare HB 1114 (HCS), § 2, p. 2, ln. 56–61, 2012 Ga. Gen. Assem., with HB 1114, as 
introduced, § 2, p. 2–3, ln. 48–88, 2012 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 28. HB 1114, as introduced, § 2, p. 2–3, ln. 48–79, 2012 Ga. Gen. Assem.; see also House Video, 
supra note 20, at 1 hr., 00 min., 56 sec. (remarks by Rep. Ed Setzler (R-35th)) (noting the difficulty of 
creating a new tort framework). 
 29. HB 1114 (HCS), § 2, p. 2, ln. 59–61, 2012 Ga. Gen. Assem.; see also Setzler Interview, supra 
note 15 (highlighting the importance of awarding reasonable attorney’s fees to gain access to counsel 
and provide clarity for the courts); House Video, supra note 20, at 1 hr., 6 min., 6 sec. (remarks by Mr. 
Jonathan Crumbley, Attorney representing Susan Selmer, the decedent’s wife, in the civil suit against 
Final Exit Network, Inc.) (noting the importance of an attorney’s fees clause to provide “a mechanism” 
for civil attorneys to pursue claims involving actual assisted suicides). 
 30. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 1114, May 10, 2012. 
 31. Compare HB 1114 (CSFA), § 1, p. 2, ln. 42–47, 2012 Ga. Gen. Assem., with HB 1114 (HCS), 
§ 2, p. 2, ln. 42–46, 2012 Ga. Gen. Assem. See Video Recording of House Floor Debate, Mar. 7, 2012 at 
1 hr., 48 min., 5 sec. (remarks by Rep. David Ralston (R-7th)), 
http://www.gpb.org/lawmakers/2012/day-30. 
 32. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, HB 214 (Mar. 7, 2011). 
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Consideration and Passage by the Senate 
Senator William Ligon, Jr. (R-3rd) sponsored HB 1114 in the 
Senate, and the bill was first read on March 7, 2012.33 On that day, 
Lieutenant Governor Casey Cagle (R) assigned the bill to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, which favorably reported a Senate Committee 
substitute on March 22, 2012.34 The Senate Committee substitute 
contained only one major substantive change from the bill as passed 
by the House.35 It added the offense of assisted suicide to the 
“Georgia RICO (Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) 
Act” definitions, thus effectively turning assisted suicide into a 
predicate offense to liability under RICO.36 
The Senate Committee substitute was read a second time on March 
22, 2012, and a third time on March 27, 2012.37 Additionally, on 
March 27, 2012, the Senate passed the Senate Committee substitute 
by a vote of 48 to 1 and transmitted it back to the House of 
Representatives.38 
Further Actions by the House and Senate 
On March 29, 2012, the House agreed to a House amendment of 
the Senate Committee substitute by a vote of 115 to 53, and the 
Senate agreed with the House Amendment of the Senate Committee 
substitute by a vote of 38 to 11.39 The most important substantive 
change in the bill, as passed the House and Senate, was the exclusion 
of the provision providing for the award of reasonable attorney’s fees 
and the cost of litigation under certain circumstances.40 
                                                                                                                 
 33. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 1114, May 10, 2012. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See HB 1114 (SCS), § 2, p. 2, ln. 57–61, 2012 Ga. Gen. Assem. The House initially considered 
the RICO amendment because of the number of assisted suicides that networks facilitating the 
commission of a suicide are potentially involved in on a nation-wide scale. See Setzler Interview, supra 
note 15. 
 36. HB 1114 (SCS), § 2, p. 2, ln. 57–61, 2012 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 37. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 1114, May 10, 2012. 
 38. Georgia Senate Voting Record, HB 1114 (Mar. 27, 2012). 
 39. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, HB 1114 (Mar. 29, 2012); Georgia Senate 
Voting Record, HB 1114 (Mar. 29, 2012); State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 1114, 
May 10, 2012. 
 40. Compare HB 1114 (CSFA), § 2, p. 2, ln. 60–62, 2012 Ga. Gen. Assem., with HB 1114 (LC 29 
5288S), 2012 Ga. Gen. Assem. See also O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-1, 16-14-3, 51-4-6 (Supp. 2012). 
6
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Signing into law by the Governor 
The House sent the bill to the Governor on April 10, 2012. 
Governor Nathan Deal signed HB 1114 into law on May 1, 2012.41 
The Act 
The Act amends three code sections of the Official Code of 
Georgia Annotated, including Georgia’s homicide statute, RICO 
statute, and tort statute relating to reporting requirements.42 The 
primary purpose of the Act is to criminalize assisted suicide, making 
it a felony punishable by imprisonment of up to ten years.43 
Section 1 of the Act amends Georgia’s homicide statute by 
repealing and replacing the old Code section 16-5-5.44 Section 16-5-5 
of the Act uses the same definition of “suicide” previously provided 
in the repealed Code section 16-5-5, but it also introduces new 
terminology—the words “assists,” and “health care provider.”45 Next, 
it provides that a person commits a felony if he has “actual 
knowledge” that an individual plans to commit suicide and 
“knowingly and willfully assists” in its commission.46 A person 
found guilty under Code section 16-5-5 will be punished by 
imprisonment of one to ten years.47 Further, it identifies specific 
situations that will not be considered assisted suicide, such as 
prescribing pain medications, withdrawing medications, and 
withholding nourishment.48 Consent of the patient or the patient’s 
                                                                                                                 
 41. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 1114, May 10, 2012. 
 42. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-5, 16-14-3, 51-4-6 (2011). 
 43. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-5 (Supp. 2012). 
 44. Compare O.C.G.A. § 16-5-5 (Supp. 2012), with O.C.G.A. § 16-5-5 (2011). 
 45. Compare O.C.G.A. § 16-5-5(a) (Supp. 2012), with O.C.G.A. § 16-5-5(a) (2011) (“Suicide” is 
defined as “the intentional and willful termination of one’s own life.”). “Assists” is defined as “the act 
of physically helping or physically providing the means.” O.C.G.A. § 16-5-5(a) (Supp. 2012). “Health 
care provider” is defined as “any person licensed, certified, or registered” pursuant to enumerated 
chapters within Title 43. Id. 
 46. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-5(b) (Supp. 2012). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. § 16-5-5(c). The exclusions enumerated in section 16-5-5(c) of the Act hinge on patient 
consent and advocacy. As Representative Setzler explained, allowing legitimate medical care to reach 
individuals receiving end-of-life care was a substantial concern during drafting of the legislation. House 
Video, supra note 20, at 48 min., 33 sec. (remarks by Rep. Ed Setzler (R-35th)). The section 
distinguishes between acts that have the mens rea to effectuate another person’s death and acts that may 
hasten or increase the chance of death but are not intended to cause death. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-5(c) (Supp. 
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advocate who is acting in the patient’s best interest is required for 
certain actions to not be considered assisted suicide.49 Finally, this 
section pinpoints necessary reporting requirements for health care 
providers who have been convicted under old Code section 16-5-5 
and requires that a convicted health care provider must advise any 
applicable licensing board of the conviction within ten days.50 In 
turn, the licensing board must immediately revoke the health care 
provider’s license to practice.51 
Section 2 of the Act amends Code section 16-14-3 by adding the 
offense of assisted suicide to the items that constitute racketeering 
activities under Georgia’s RICO statute.52 Finally, section 3 of the 
Act amends Code section 51-4-6, concerning wrongful death tort 
claims, by adding another reporting requirement for any health care 
provider who has been found liable for wrongful death—the provider 
must notify his licensing board within ten days of the judgment so 
that disciplinary actions may be instituted.53 
Analysis 
Comparison to Other States’ Statutes 
Georgia is not unique in enacting legislation to criminalize assisted 
suicide. Many states have enacted legislation that makes aiding and 
abetting suicide a criminal offense.54 Like Georgia, most states have 
preferred to enact separate legislation regarding assisted suicide and 
have removed the crime from consideration under homicide statutes, 
thereby typically reducing the penalty for violating the statute.55 
                                                                                                                 
2012). 
 49. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-5(c) (Supp. 2012). 
 50. Id. § 16-5-5(d). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. § 16-14-3(9)(A). “‘Racketeering activity’ means to commit, to attempt to commit, or to 
solicit, coerce, or intimidate another person to commit any crime which is chargeable by indictment” 
under several specific Georgia laws, such as homicide, theft, robbery, bribery, influencing witnesses, 
distributing obscene materials, insurance fraud, and residential mortgage fraud. Id. 
 53. Id. § 51-4-6(b). 
 54. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-42-1-2.5 (2012); MINN. STAT. § 609.215 (2012); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 30-2-4 (2012). But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17.1 (2012) (abolishing suicide as a crime); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 163.117 (2012) (decriminalizing suicide by making it a defense to murder). 
 55. 83 C.J.S. Suicide § 9 (2012). “[T]he general trend reflected by modern statutes is to mitigate the 
punishment for assisting a suicide by removing it from the harsh consequences of homicide law and 
8
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However, several states make a distinction between assisting suicide 
and causing suicide.56 An individual who causes suicide by force, 
duress, or deception may be charged with homicide.57 
Furthermore, Georgia’s statute mirrors the statutes in other states, 
particularly in respect to its distinction concerning a physical act, its 
exclusion of certain medical procedures, and its impact on tort 
litigation.58 Indiana punishes “[p]rovid[ing] the physical means by 
which the other person attempts or commits suicide” and 
“[p]articipat[ing] in a physical act by which the other person attempts 
or commits suicide.”59 Likewise, Georgia only penalizes those 
individuals who “physically help[] or physically provid[e] the 
means” to commit suicide.60 Similar to Georgia’s statute, 
Minnesota’s statute contains a specific provision that enumerates 
several activities that are not considered assisted suicide and are not 
punishable, such as administering or prescribing medications or 
procedures to relieve pain, even if these acts are likely to hasten or 
increase the risk of death.61 Minnesota’s legislation specifically 
                                                                                                                 
giving it a separate criminal classification more carefully tailored to the actual culpability of the aider 
and abettor.” Id. However, in the case of suicide pacts where two or more individuals agree to assist 
each other in committing suicide, a survivor of the pact may be charged with murder if he directly 
performed the act that resulted in another member of the pact’s death. See MINN. STAT. § 609.215 
(2012) (advisory committee comment); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (2011) (criminal law 
commission comments) (stating that if the defendant’s conduct “made him the agent of the death, the 
offense is criminal homicide notwithstanding the consent or even the solicitations of the victim”). 
 56.  See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-04 (2011) (distinguishing assisting suicide and causing 
suicide); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2505 (2012) (treating causing suicide as criminal homicide and aiding 
suicide as a separate offense). 
 57. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-6 (2012) (criminalizing causing suicide as a second degree 
crime and assisting suicide as a fourth degree crime); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2505 (2012) (stating that 
“[a] person may be convicted of criminal homicide for causing another to commit suicide only if he 
intentionally causes such suicide by force, duress or deception”). However, if a person aids or solicits 
suicide, this is considered an independent offense and constitutes a second degree felony. Id. But see 
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.117 (2012) (indicating that it is a defense to murder that the defendant caused or 
aided in the commission of suicide, except when the defendant used duress or deception). 
 58. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-42-1-2.5 (2012) (requiring a physical act and excluding specific 
medical procedures and medications from being considered assisted suicide); MINN. STAT. § 609.215 
(2012) (containing provisions for civil damages in the event that a person violates the statute). 
 59. IND. CODE § 35-42-1-2.5(b) (2012). But see MINN. STAT. § 609.215 (2012) (criminalizing 
conduct that does not constitute a physical act, such as advising and encouraging an individual to 
commit suicide). 
 60. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-5(a)(1) (Supp. 2012). 
 61. Compare O.C.G.A. § 16-5-5(c) (Supp. 2012), with MINN. STAT. § 609.215(3) (2012). Georgia’s 
Code section indicates that assisted suicide will not comprise: “[P]rescribing, dispensing, or 
administering medications or medical procedures when such actions are calculated or intended to relieve 
or prevent such patient’s pain or discomfort . . . even if the . . . procedure may have the effect of 
9
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includes a provision for tort damages against an individual who 
commits the crime of assisted suicide; Georgia avoided creating a 
new tort for assisted suicide and relies on a wrongful death cause of 
action.62 
Equal Protection Concerns 
The primary focus of challenges concerning assisted suicide bans 
is equal protection under the law.63 The Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause states, “No State shall . . . deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”64 In 
the landmark Supreme Court case of Vacco v. Quill, the plaintiffs, 
who were several New York physicians and three terminally ill 
patients, argued that New York’s ban on assisted suicide violated the 
Equal Protection Clause because the law treated similarly situated 
persons differently.65 The Court rejected this argument and held that 
the law was evenhandedly applied to all persons and therefore 
constitutional.66 “Everyone, regardless of physical condition, is 
entitled, if competent, to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical 
                                                                                                                 
hastening or increasing the risk of death” or “discontinuing, withholding, or withdrawing medications, 
medical procedures, nourishment, or hydration.” O.C.G.A. § 16-5-5(c) (Supp. 2012). Minnesota’s 
statute indicates that a health care provider “who administers, prescribes, or dispenses medications or 
procedures to relieve another person’s pain or discomfort, even if the medication or procedure may 
hasten or increase the risk of death, does not violate this section . . . .” MINN. STAT. § 609.215(3) (2012). 
Furthermore, a health care provider will not violate the statute if he “withholds or withdraws a life-
sustaining procedure . . . in accordance with reasonable medical practice . . . .” Id. 
 62. MINN. STAT. § 609.215(5) (2012); House Video, supra note 20, at 1 hr. 2 min., 18 sec. (remarks 
by Rep. Ed Setzler (R-35th)). Minnesota’s statute calls for compensatory and punitive damages against 
any person who violates the law and includes a provision for mandatory attorney fees in the event that 
the plaintiff successfully brings suit. MINN. STAT. § 609.215(5) (2012). Representative Setzler advised 
that creating a new tort was “very problematic” and determined that a cause of action under Georgia’s 
existing wrongful death statute was an adequate civil remedy. House Video, supra note 20, at 1 hr., 00 
min., 56 sec. (remarks by Rep. Ed Setzler (R-35th)). He also sought to include a provision similar to 
Minnesota’s regarding an award of attorney fees, but the provision did not survive committee. House 
Video, supra note 20, at 1 hr., 4 min., 43 sec. (remarks by Rep. Ed Setzler (R-35th)). 
 63. See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 797–98 (1997) (claiming that New York’s statute 
criminalizing assisting suicide violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause). 
 64. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 65. Vacco, 521 U.S. at 797–98. The plaintiffs argued that because a patient was allowed to refuse 
life-sustaining treatment that would likely result in death, but could not obtain the assistance of his 
physician in hastening death, the statute unfairly discriminated against those individuals who sought 
physician-assisted suicide. Id. 
 66. Id. at 800. 
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treatment; no one is permitted to assist a suicide.”67 Similarly, in 
Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court faced a challenge by 
several terminally ill patients and their physicians that Washington’s 
ban on assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection Clause.68 The 
plaintiffs argued that there is a fundamental liberty interest 
concerning the right to physician-assisted suicide.69 Like New York’s 
statute, Washington’s statute did not criminalize refusal of life-
sustaining treatment.70 Again, the Court rejected the contention that 
this distinction resulted in a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.71 
Georgia’s Act is likely to overcome similar equal protection 
challenges because it comports with the statutes involved in these 
Supreme Court cases. Section 16-5-5 of the Act criminalizes all 
assisted suicide and effectively defines what constitutes “assisting” 
under the law.72 It similarly allows a competent patient to refuse life-
sustaining treatment without fear of criminal recourse and protects 
doctors from being held criminally liable for complying with a 
patient’s desire to refuse this treatment.73 
Consequences of the Act 
A potential consequence of the Act is that it overly legislates 
actions of physicians and fails to adequately provide a remedy when 
non-physicians assist in the commission of suicide. Code section 
16-5-5 specifically calls for reporting requirements if a health care 
provider commits the crime of assisted suicide.74 Furthermore, in 
section 16-5-5(d), the Act requires that a health care provider’s 
licensing board revoke the provider’s license.75 Therefore, the Act 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Id. 
 68. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 708 (1997). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 717. 
 71. Id. at 735. 
 72. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-5 (Supp. 2012). 
 73. Id. § 16-5-5(c). Under this section of the Code, it is clear that a patient must give consent for 
medications to be administered to relieve pain that may hasten death and for nourishment, medications, 
or medical procedures to be withheld. Id. A medical provider who performs these acts with the patient’s 
consent will not commit the crime of assisted suicide. Id. 
 74. Id. § 16-5-5(d) (requiring a health care provider convicted under the statute to notify his 
licensing board within ten days). 
 75. Id. (making it mandatory for the licensing board to revoke the health care provider’s license 
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prescribes additional penalties for a health care provider who 
commits the crime. Although the original bill was introduced in 
response to the Final Exit Network decision—involving a group of 
non-physicians76—the final result appears to be a significant attack 
on physician-assisted suicide. Additionally, because most health care 
providers will have medical malpractice insurance, it makes them 
more susceptible to a wrongful death suit.77 
The Act may draw additional criticism for not adequately defining 
consent or providing statutory requirements for obtaining consent. 
Code section 16-5-5 emphasizes the element of consent; if the health 
care provider’s actions regarding administering medications or 
withholding nourishment comport with the patient’s desires, then his 
actions are not considered assisted suicide.78 However, Code section 
16-5-5 does not provide guidance regarding the proper means by 
which a health care provider should obtain consent. For example, is a 
health care provider required to refer a patient for an independent 
psychological evaluation to determine the patient’s intent regarding 
the refusal of treatment? 
The Act contains many of the same elements as legislation in other 
states and is likely to overcome an equal protection challenge similar 
to those in Vacco and Glucksberg. However, the Act may still face 
challenges in its application to non-physicians and may make 
physicians vulnerable to tortious attack on the grounds that consent 
was not adequately obtained. 
Kelly Connors & Vera Powell 
                                                                                                                 
upon a judgment against the provider for wrongful death). 
 76. Final Exit Network, 290 Ga. at 508, 722 S.E.2d at 722. 
 77. See Alicia Gallegos, Georgia Physicians Must Reveal If They Don’t Have Liability Insurance, 
AM. MED. NEWS (June 6, 2011), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2011/06/06/gvsc0606.htm. 
Although Georgia physicians are not required to have liability insurance, the majority of the state’s 
physicians are covered by liability insurance. Id. 
 78. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-5(c) (Supp. 2012) (preventing the possibility of physician-directed euthanasia). 
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